



Roadmap and development status of joint ISO- SAE automotive cybersecurity publications and standards

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time than now to be
an intelligent power
management
company.



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Speaker Introduction

- Member and co-convener of ISO/SAE Joint-Working-Group
- Chair of ISO/SAE 21434 (TARA)
- Chair, SAE Vehicle Cybersecurity Systems Engineering Committee
- Eaton Functional Excellence, Cybersecurity & Functional Safety lead

Today's Discussion

Ongoing joint activities

Enhance existing concepts, introduce new concept, additional guidance

Timing

Release of specification and technical report

ISO/SAE 21434

Current activities as a precursor to version 2

A G E N D A

ISO/SAE PWI 8475 CAL/TAF

- *History/motivation*
- *Current state & open items*
- *Timing*

ISO/SAE PWI 8477 V&V

- *History/motivation*
- *Current state & open items*
- *Timing*

ISO/SAE 21434 2nd Edition

- *Current state*
- *Timing*

Opportunities in development

ISO/SAE PWI 8475 project

Cybersecurity Assurance Level (CAL)
&
Targeted Attack Feasibility (TAF)

Cybersecurity Assurance Level

Concept origin & motivation

History

- ***Concept development started in 2017***
- ***Initial version released as annex in 21434 in 2021***

Motivation

- ***Introduced to scale process rigor according to criticality in supply chain***
- ***Desire to leverage other static risk factors in CAL determination***
- ***Desire to expand application to all applicable 21434 requirements***
- ***Ensure consistent application to facilitate efficient communications and provide justifiable confidence***

PWI 8475 CAL/TAF group members¹



- ISO/SAE PWI 8475 CAL-TAF member countries
 - Austria
 - France
 - Japan
 - United Kingdom
 - Belgium
 - Germany
 - Republic of Korea
 - United States (SAE)
 - Canada
 - India
 - Sweden
 - Czechia


Current state of CAL development



- CAL determination
 - Early in as possible - when all required inputs are available
 - ❖ Before activities that use CAL
 - Uses same parameters as defined in 21434
 - Optionally can include other static factors (with justification)
 - ❖ Architectural considerations
 - Depth, accessibility, exposure, degree of separation, operational environment, etc.
 - Examples on subsequent slides


V2X

- Low degree of separation: highest static risk




Immobilizer

- Additional degree of separation: reduced static risk



PODS

- High degree of separation: lowest static risk



Current state of CAL development



- Higher CAL ⇔ requires additional process rigor
- Expanding and clarifying applicability by clause/requirements of 21434
 - Applicable to the following
 - ❖ Some requirements in clause 9
 - ❖ Clause 10
 - ❖ Clause 11
 - Not applicable to the following
 - ❖ Clause 5
 - ❖ Clause 6 (except for independence of assessment)
 - ❖ TARA in clause 9
 - ❖ Clauses 8, 12, 13, 14 and 15

Current state of CAL development



- Providing definitions of CAL levels and application
 - Now only 3-levels (CAL1 [basic], CAL2 [intermediate], CAL3 [advanced])
 - ❖ Tables to provide examples of how to apply i.e., activities/rigor per CAL
 - Can always do more than the specified CAL
 - Help ensure consistency in interpretation, while providing flexibility
- CAL is an attribute of a CS goal
 - Intended to be stable; required updates to be done via change mgt.
- No detailed guidance given for
 - Application in an out-of-context situation
 - Usage for off-the-shelf components

ISO/SAE PWI 8475 project

Cybersecurity Assurance Level (CAL) & *Targeted Attack Feasibility (TAF)*

Targeted Attack Feasibility

Concept origin & motivation

History

- *Concept introduced during 21434 development*
- *Postponed due to inadequate development time*

Motivation

- *As a result of the TARA, the risk treatment decision for certain threats will be to 'reduce the risk'*
 - ✓ *How do you specify the required strength of counter-measures?*
 - ✓ *How do you know if the counter-measure strength is 'sufficient'?*
- *Communicate required strength of countermeasures in supply chain*

What is TAF?

- Based on attack feasibility (AF) as defined in 21434
 - 'Attribute of an attack path describing the ease of successfully carrying out the corresponding set of actions'
- Current attack feasibility
 - Attack feasibility, considering current counter-measures, but before risk treatment
 - ❖ A factor to be considered when deciding risk treatment
- Targeted attack feasibility (TAF)
 - The target level of attack feasibility after implementation of countermeasures used to reduce residual risk to acceptable level
 - ❖ TAF and impact determine residual risk

TAF selection


- The intent is to lower current attack feasibility
 - Selection of method to mitigate the risk could also reduce impact
 - Target level is communicated with supplier
 - ❖ TAF 1 (medium AF), TAF 2 (low AF), TAF3 (very low AF)
 - Illustrated below, where “C” is current, and “T” is targeted attack feasibility

Attack Feasibility Rating	High				C
	Medium				
	Low				
	Very low				T
		Negligible	Moderate	Major	Severe
Risk Value		Impact Rating			


Potential application of TAF during design phase

- “TARA”=> output risk value, relative to threat/damage scenario (impact and attack feasibility)
- Derive CS goals and associated TAF
- Determines how to layer the protections (DiD)

- Refine & verify CS requirements, architecture, design: selection of controls (considering interfaces)
- Allocation of requirements to architectural elements
- Identify and manage vulnerabilities
- Selection of cybersecurity controls due to TAF (strength, depth)



ISO/SAE PWI 8475 CAL/TAF timeline



Expect a Q1 release in 2026



¹ Draft Publicly Available Specification (DPAS)
² ISO/SAE Joint Working Group (JWG) F2F meeting

ISO/SAE PWI 8477 V&V

Technical Report - Verification and Validation

Concept origin & motivation

History

- ***Some content originally in annex of earlier draft of 21434***
- ***Removed from 21434 before publication due to lack of content***

Motivation


- ***Provide clarity on verification and validation and their relationship***
- ***Describe verification activities relative the 21434 requirements***
- ***Describe validation activities relative to cybersecurity goals, claims, etc.***
- ***Provide strategic guidance on V&V activities***

Current state of V&V TR development



- Topics-current state
 - Defining verification and validation
 - Confirmation that CS requirements are adequate
 - Confirmation that implementation satisfies the CS requirements
 - Confirmation that assumptions hold true
 - Relationship between V&V and CS requirements, risk, activities
 - Example V&V methods
 - Application to off-the-shelf, reused & out-of-context components

ISO/SAE PWI 8477 V&V TR timeline



Expect a Q4 2025 release



¹Draft Technical Report (DTR)


ISO/SAE 21434 2nd edition

ISO/SAE 21434 2nd edition



- Collected feedback from industry in 2024
- Content from current CAL, TAF and V&V projects will be leveraged
- Topics and concepts discussed during current projects as input
- Work delayed due to current joint ISO-SAE projects (CAL/TAF, V&V)

ISO/SAE 21434 v2 timeline



Expect start of development 2026 (3+ years)

Opportunities to contribute to development of standards and publications



- Need experienced individuals
- Several SAE committees/task forces need volunteers
 - TARA task force
 - Best practices
 - Exchange of TARA information in supply chain (e.g., format of information)
 - Supply Chain BOM task force
 - Initially create an information report
 - Goal of publishing a best practice or standard
 - 21434 2nd edition (future need)
 - Output from above task forces may be included in 2nd edition
- Contact John Krzeszewski for additional information

Questions?

Thank you!

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